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ABSTRACT – The article deals with the issue of human rights regarding 
the potential for consensus among cultures by means of an intercultural 
dialogue. It is a contribution towards overcoming the confrontations 
among civilizations and to the eradication of the coercive imposing of 
human rights onto other cultures. The paper demonstrates that the 
intercultural promotion of human rights across individual cultures that 
recognize each other is one of the effective forms of resistance against 
people being misrecognized. However, this requires a formulation 
of human rights based on the values of individual cultures and the 
dialogue among them. The interpretation of the paper is a contribution 
to creating ‘unity in plurality’, i.e. a universality of human rights within 
the plurality of cultures.
KEYWORDS – Cultures. Intercultural dialogue. Human rights.
RESUMO – O artigo trata da questão dos direitos humanos quanto ao 
potencial de consenso entre culturas através do diálogo intercultural. 
Trata-se de uma contribuição para superar os confrontos entre 
civilizações e a imposição coercitiva de direitos humanos sobre outras 
culturas. O paper mostra que a promoção intercultural de direitos 
humanos entre culturas individuais que se reconhecem mutuamente é 
uma das formas efetivas de resistência contra a falta de reconhecimento. 
Todavia, é mister uma formulação dos direitos humanos embasada nos 
valores de culturas individuais e no diálogo entre elas. A interpretação 
aqui adotada é uma contribuição para criar ‘unidade na pluralidade’, 
i.e. uma universalidade de direitos humanos dentro da pluralidade de 
culturas.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Culturas. Diálogo intercultural. Direitos humanos
Different cultures interpret human rights in different ways. Therefore, 
it is not at all surprising that we are confronted with clashes among 
cultures. In this article, I will concentrate on the issue of human rights 
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regarding the potential for consensus among cultures by means of an 
intercultural dialogue. The article may be considered as a contribution 
towards overcoming the confrontations among civilizations and to 
the eradication of the coercive imposing of human rights onto other 
cultures. 
I would like to demonstrate that the intercultural promotion of 
human rights across individual cultures is one of the effective forms of 
resistance against people being misrecognized. However, this requires 
a formulation of human rights based on the values of individual cultures 
and the dialogue among them. In the first part of the article, I will briefly 
discuss the topic of conflict and dialogue; in the second part, I will focus 
in a hermeneutic way on the intercultural and inter-civilization nature of 
this conflict; in the third part, I will concentrate on human rights per se, 
and in the final part, I will touch on the legislation concerning human 
rights.
Such an interpretation which is a contribution to creating ‘unity in 
plurality’ is not entirely a matter of course. The attention of most people 
is focused either purely on intercultural dialogue and the issues of cultural 
plurality or only on human rights and the issues of the universality of 
civilization of all human beings. The attempt to create a connection 
between both types of discourse may be interpreted as a part of an 
eradication of the frequent ideological misuse of human rights which 
deforms the intercultural dialogue and commonly shared human rights 
together with the conditions for their realization.
1.  Conflict and dialogue
There are frequent intercultural conflicts in the present global climate 
which is characteristic of an increasing number of interactions of people 
from different cultures from the fields of economy, communication or other 
types of cultural interaction. This does not always mean a state of war. 
Conflicts take on diverse forms from the cultivated to aggressive ones 
(Arnason 2003). Although the confrontation of cultures and civilizations 
leads towards the polarization and culmination of the conflict, the 
intercultural dialogue among cultures attempts to contribute to their 
mutual recognition.1
These forms of conflict resolution did not develop as separate thought 
entities but stem from the development of mutual conflict relationships 
between people and the requirements for their resolution. The process of 
misrecognition of certain groups of populations in the long term historical   
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recognition see: Taylor (1992); Fraser, Honneth (2003). M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
  Veritas, v. 55, n. 1, jan./abr. 2010, p. 183-205  185
perspective causes their justified dissatisfaction and articulation of their 
claims for recognition. At the same time some types of misrecognition 
might be initiated by artificial conflicts which are invoked for the 
purpose of the legitimization of particular power structures or for the 
purpose of unjust economic and other interests. Despite the fact that 
some confrontations between cultures are fictional because they are 
forced upon people without any essential connection with the reality, a 
possibility of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ has at least a partial influence on 
the transformation of these conflicts into serious and real confrontations. 
The example may be the conflict between the West and Islam. The 
relationships between people are then formed as a complex of real and 
fictitious conflicts.
People react critically to the disadvantages and other forms of 
oppression which they face and in this way they map the individual 
problems that need to be resolved. In the background of their experienced 
reality they notice positive fragments of reality and try to develop them. 
In a relatively favorable environment, the criticism of current forms of 
misrecognition and attempts to correct them may be realized in the form 
of a cultivated intercultural dialogue. The notion of conflict then includes 
the notion of consensus which may assist the direction towards the 
desired final state.
The intercultural dialogue attempts to identify the current social norms 
through critical discussion and create new ones that might be shared 
by individual cultures in a universal way. Because the communication 
does not concern only two cultures and therefore a dia-logue in the literal 
sense, it is more precise to talk of a poly-logue.2 Such a broad concept 
of the discourse cannot in the least supplement the solutions to all the 
social, economic, political and other related problems. What can be 
done is nevertheless to provide conditions for an important intercultural 
framework for working on these problems.
The discourse which is the subject of my analysis contains two 
fundamental elements. The first one relates to the forming of a dialogue 
‘from below’ from the perspective of various cultures and their relationship 
within human civilization. The second element is in the form of universal 
human rights which may be the outcome of this type of dialogue. This 
kind of approach, which is gradually formulated and subjected to many 
comments from individual cultures, could be the unifying and universal 
element (An-nA’IM, 2002). In short, the objective is to reach a commonly   
 
2  See The Forum for Intercultural Philosophy Polylog that holds a scientific discussion 
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shared ‘transcultural’ consensus through intercultural means in order 
to replace the current supra-cultural situation which is not universally 
accepted.
2.  Culture and civilization
What does it mean to talk about the dialogue which is supposed to 
be intercultural? The adjective may be initially read as an umbrella term 
which covers the relationships among individual cultures or civilizations 
or culture/civilization circles. This definition raises the question about the 
relationship between the words culture and civilization. The preliminary 
answer might be to define them as synonyms but under the condition 
that the limits and any possible misunderstandings are clarified before 
using these terms. Their frequent inter-changing is not only the case in 
the Western languages. For example there is also the Arabic word umran, 
which has a prominent place already in the teaching of Ibn Khaldun 
from the 14th century, which can be translated either as civilization or 
as culture.
Some authors prefer to use the word civilization rather than the 
synonym approach. Yasuaki Onuma presents this term as more appropriate 
because the word culture may be interpreted also in a restricted sense 
in which it speaks only about art works and works with an aesthetic 
function (OnUMA, 1999). This is certainly correct. Moreover, aside this 
interpretation, another use of the word culture exists which is bound only 
by one type of human rights which are the cultural rights. Also in this 
case the word cultural is conceived in a limited sense which is concerned 
with the broader issue of the intercultural conflict about human rights, 
including the cultural rights (KROEBER and KLUCKHOHn, 1963).
The word civilization is likewise not used in one sense only. On 
the one hand it is designated to the whole human civilization in the 
entire humanity while on the other hand it is designated to just one 
of the civilizational or cultural circles; it is used for example in relation 
to the civilization or culture of the West, Islam or the Confucian world 
(BEnjAMIn, 1973).
The first mentioned meaning of the word civilization has its origin in 
defining a specific stage of development of society or culture (DIAMOnD, 
1997). Civilization is trying to overcome the primitive stage of cultural 
development. It begins to essentially defer from a primitive culture at 
the moment when it becomes characterized by the complex organization 
of its society. Whereas primitive societies seem to be relatively static, 
civilizations are characterized by the process of development. It is 
possible to speak in detail about the gradual development from hordes M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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to tribes and chiefdom to state and super-state formations. The criteria 
of differentiating between these types of cultures has taken into account 
population density, patterns of colonization, relationships between 
relatives or relationships within the society, the intensification of food 
production, the introduction of the division of labor and egalitarian 
or centralized types of decision making, informal or legal conflict 
management and so on. The trajectory of development had previously 
only its regional character, and its various historical stages were analyzed 
in far more detail than the complex planetary trajectory. Once the 
civilization stage of development of the majority of cultures spread on 
the planet, the discussion was concerned with one civilization of the 
whole humankind. Therefore, from the point of view of this explanation, 
the development proceeds from cultures to civilization. This process also 
allows the discussion about progress or regress.3
This interpretation is also compatible with the relating of civilization 
to the practical-technical sides of a society although the term ‘culture’ is 
then used in the opposite sense, that is not as more primitive but more 
developed product of a society. The distinction between culture and 
civilization is based on defining civilization by the technical dimensions 
of the society such as script, urbanism and so on. Culture is then ascribed, 
sometimes not without difficulties, to the more refined role related to 
values and humanistic ideals (TönnIES, 2005).
The disadvantage of this way of defining the word civilization, as 
used with regards to individual participating civilizations (Western, 
Islamic, Confucian and so on) is that it does not allow for discussion 
about inter-civilizational dialogue with cultures that did not reach the 
civilization stage of development. Dialogue is then reduced only to the 
discussion amongst technically developed civilizations and other cultures 
are left in power dependence on them or in other kind of dependence 
relationship.
Moreover the use of only one word civilization in the plural as well as 
the singular sense has a tendency to contentiously erase the difference 
between the cultural (plural) and the cosmopolitan (singular) meanings. 
These multiple meanings have their consequences for intercultural 
and transcultural discussion. The use of the word civilization in the 
plural sense may implicitly cling towards a discussion which omits the 
acknowledgment of differences of individual cultures and which aims 
towards a unifying approach. This approach then defines cultures with 
an emphasis on one civilization of the whole of humanity only. This   
 
3  See, for example, Adorno, Horkheimer (1988; 1st ed. Publ. in 1944). Compare with 
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kind of approach is usually not an embodiment of a true universalism 
which in the intercultural dialogue of a desirable and non-imposing 
manner tries to unify the current positive elements of individual cultures 
while also suggesting universally acceptable elements which could be 
voluntarily shared between individual cultures. It is more often the case 
of an imperialist point of view, whether reflected or not, which under the 
heading of civilization promotes one culture over another. The history 
of colonialism and the forms of colonialism which were legitimized 
by European universalism or more preciously by pseudo-universalism 
are its unfortunate consequences (WALLERSTEIn, 2006). The meta-
theoretical viewpoints commit the same transgression which without 
the contribution of other cultures and from the viewpoint of one culture, 
attempt to dictate which social concepts, values and so on, are relevant 
and eventually should be considered as universal. All these approaches 
are usually defined as a cultural imperialism (SAID, 1994; KögLER, 
2005).
One way of preventing these kinds of problems is firstly to retain the 
wider sense of the term civilization, that is to use it only in the singular 
sense for defining the whole of human civilization and secondly to define 
the term culture by its plural connection with individual societies. The 
word culture might be seducing to various partial conceptions as I 
already mentioned, from culture as a collection of art works, to cultural 
aspects of various areas, for example cultural rights, to cultures which 
have not developed into complex civilizations and which have not the use 
of technology and also to cultures as a synonym of civilizations. Despite 
this wider notion, it is always various partial entities and not culture as 
a singular whole which is under consideration because culture is not 
usually thought of as an all-human culture but rather as various cultures 
or cultural plurality. Here we might refer to Majid Tehranian who, in his 
analysis of civilization and resolving of its conflicts, says that it is more 
adequate to analyze one human civilization and many human cultures 
(TEHRAnIAn, 2007).
At the same time we should reject fixating purely on one of these 
categories, on civilization in a singular sense or on culture in plural sense. 
It is necessary to acknowledge both, the differences of individual cultures 
as well as the common values which bring humanity as a whole into one 
civilization.4 The key is that in this definition it is possible to respect 
plurality of opinions and to work ‘from below’ of individual cultures and   
 
4  In the similar types of discussions within the framework of the national state, it is 
usual to differentiate between the politics of recognition or of difference and the 
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aim towards their interconnectedness in one civilization. It seems to be 
appropriate from this viewpoint to reserve the plural meaning for the word 
culture and the singular meaning for the word civilization. At the same 
time there is a continuous exchange between the social constructions of 
these terms. Moreover, I would like to add that the concepts of culture 
and civilization, which are defined in the opposite sense than I presented 
here, may also reach a reasonable content of interpretation.5 The key is 
to define positions with the aid of terms and not by fixating on these 
terms.
One of the previously mentioned problems, which arises in connection 
with cultural imperialism, is the cultural particularism. Regarding 
its content it often promotes the same values as cultural imperialism 
but in its opposition it openly advocates its specifically non-universal 
viewpoint. Due to the fact that the advocates of cultural particularism 
emphasize essential differences of individual cultures, they frequently 
tend towards the opinion that individual cultures cannot reach commonly 
shared values and therefore they cannot in certain respects unify in one 
civilization and the community of human beings. The absence of the 
potential universal consensus predetermines this viewpoint, together 
with the cultural imperialism, to the confrontation of cultures. In this 
respect the word culture as well as the world civilization has the negative 
connotations because they both can refer to Kulturkampf or the Clash of 
Civilizations.6
While placing an emphasis on insurmountable differences between 
individual cultures, the advocates of cultural imperialism and cultural 
particularism frequently perceive cultures in a segregate way, as 
historically enclosed units and unchangeable given entities. Individual 
cultures are here conceived as specific essences (WALLERSTEIn, 2006). 
However, the essentialist view is disturbed by efforts to construct not 
only random elements of intercultural consensus based on the current 
partial overlapping of various cultural values, but also by elements of such 
a transcultural consensus which requires openness of individual cultures 
towards partial re-definition of their values. The intercultural dialogue does 
not accept the essentialist view. The essentialist view is confronted by 
the critique of generalization of cultures and the emphasis on the gradual 
formation of cultural patterns as social constructs which means the 
rejection of the transcultural essentialist view (SAMSOn, SMITH, 1996). 
 
5  It is possible to say that this is, to a large extent, a matter of terminology polemic 
and not of content polemics. See, for example, Onuma (1999).
6  Authors who develop these thoughts use these words often as synonyms. See, for 
example, Huntington (1996). Compare with an alternative interpretation: Senghaas 
(2007).M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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Rejection of the essentialist view should not on the other hand lead 
towards the relativist view which is at the same time a resignation 
concerning the non-contingent transcultural consensus.
The conception of cultures in the intercultural and transcultural 
dialogue also requires a more exact identification of the cultural subjects 
of the dialogue. In relation to Lawrence Blum, the three categories can be 
distinguished, although none of which have to be designated definitely 
and can transform in time (BLUM, 1998; IngRAM, 1998). Firstly, it is 
possible to speak of an individual who is formed by a particular culture 
or an individual with a particular cultural identity (identities). Secondly, 
we may discuss a group of individuals specified by particular culture or 
group with particular cultural identity. Thirdly, we can analyze an entire 
culture.
The first category of the subject is not in the centre of attention in the 
intercultural dialogue because the dialogue primarily follows relationships 
between larger cultural units than individuals. The relationships at the 
individual level are certainly also important though, in the conflict of 
entire cultures, millions of individual persons do not enter into discussion 
but rather the representatives of people who can promote their individual 
and group interests. nevertheless, it is important to make sure that the 
representatives of individual cultures do not represent just their own 
view and their own culture only marginally. But also in the case when 
the representatives are successful in representing their culture, they 
should not represent the mainstream of their culture more predominantly; 
it is obviously desirable to acknowledge the minority streams as well. 
This opens the question of a multi-cultural dialogue within the intra-
cultural framework between the majority and minorities, between men 
and women, and so on (TAYLOR, 1994; SEngHAAS, 1998). Intra-cultural 
conflicts also largely relate to social conflicts. As mentioned by Yash 
ghai in the context of East-Asian economies, a particular territory does 
not offer just one access to rights but the heads of companies stress 
other laws than unionists, and minorities emphasize other laws than 
the members of the majority, etc. (gHAI, 1999). Within the framework 
of intercultural dialogue, it is important to remember these significant 
socio-economic factors.
The other category which is formed by culturally formed groups 
of individuals includes in a more restricted sense the majority of the 
population of France, for example, and in the broader sense, the majority 
of the entire Western population. It is the population of the European 
Union, USA and other countries which have similarly specified cultural, 
economic and political systems, such as Canada, Australia and so on. 
A similar type of discussion could be initiated in relation to Islamic M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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minorities in France and in the European Union in general. Although 
this is not a general rule, these minorities are often culturally related 
to the majority of another country: the Turkish minority in germany is 
culturally related to the majority in Turkey, for example. Minorities and 
majorities of course cannot be considered as fixed and the ratio between 
the minority and the majority may significantly transform in time or even 
reverse its course.
The third category, which is formed by entire cultures or civilizations, 
if I use this term imprecisely, includes the creations of culturally defined 
groups, from art works to various social customs and finally to the whole 
life in the society, which is a collection of various social, political, legal and 
other entities. In the wider context and from the long-term perspective, 
it is also possible to add population to these creations which may be 
considered as a cultural product of itself. Population as it stands does 
not perceive itself as an object but asserts itself primarily as a creating 
subject which gradually forms cultural customs, rules and objects in 
interaction with the related environment.
What would it mean to refer to the third category in an intercultural 
dialogue which means the entire cultures? Charles Taylor speaks of the 
entire cultures when he expresses the need to recognize a cultural value of 
cultures which is required not only for a dialogue but in particular for their 
own life. He says that we should analyze and recognize the equal value 
of cultures (TAYLOR, 1994). In Taylor’s interpretation, the recognition of 
equal respect to different cultures is analogous to the recognition of the 
equal dignity of individuals.
The question remains whether or not it is appropriate to apply an 
equal approach to individuals, which we implement in relation to their 
common characteristics, humanity or citizenship, for example, also for 
the recognition of cultures (BLUM, 1998). This approach to cultures seems 
problematic for two reasons. The first is the gnoseological argument about 
the difficulties in measuring the value of individual cultures. In order to 
evaluate the Afro-American culture or the Roma culture, for example, 
it would mean to consider them as some kind of totality to which we 
attribute a specific measurable value. The second argument relates to the 
difficulty in comparing the value of individual cultures even if this value 
was measurable. This does not mean the tendency towards relativism but 
only the acknowledgement of the problems of comparing entire cultures. 
The claim for value stems from justified and historically founded fears of 
dismissive Euro-centric or today more of a West-centric approach towards 
other cultures. One of the sources of this problematic approach is based 
on the thorough evaluative comparison of cultures which often led to the 
conclusion that the Euro-American culture is superior to other cultures.M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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If we abandon these kinds of rigorous cultural comparisons and 
try to redefine Taylor’s formulation by focusing primarily on the equal 
recognition of groups of people which are defined by a particular culture, 
there is a chance that we also rid ourselves of the dismissive West-centric 
attitude. Then, it will be possible to better understand the requirements 
of the politics of recognition. It is also necessary not to slip towards 
an interpretation which homogeneously ignores various groups of 
individuals with diverse cultural identity, or to the approach which uses 
exact techniques of measurement and subsequently sorts them into 
hierarchic categories.
These kinds of arguments lead back to the second category of the 
subject, i.e. to groups of individuals, whether they are small communities 
in the position of a minority or larger communities in the form of a majority 
or even entire ‘cultures’, although here it is cultures in the sense of groups 
of individuals and not cultural entities which are not defined by human 
subjects.
groups  of  individuals  may  at  the  same  time  have  two  basic 
requirements which are often connected with legal requirements: one is 
the claim for their recognition as subjects with different cultural identity 
which will not be ignored, and the second requirement is the claim 
that these groups as subjects of a dialogue and action are recognized 
by others as equal to other groups. Although this kind of conception 
of subjects of intercultural dialogue is not entirely ideal and requires a 
certain amount of reformulation which is not necessary for the purpose of 
this text, nevertheless, this approach is more suitable than the approach 
which talks about entire cultures or civilizations without a recognition 
of the groups of individuals. In the contemporary global age when 
national states losing their dominant position, to adopt a politics towards 
culturally defined groups of individuals is a politics which is generally 
more farsighted than the current obsolete stance of international law 
which is almost entirely fixated on national states.7
3.  Human Rights
In continuity with the explanation I offered above, it is possible to say 
that the connecting element between the cultures, which are primarily   
 
7  It is important to add that recognition should aim not only towards contemporary 
components of groups of individuals but also towards the entire historical 
experience of these groups. For example, to recognize only the present components 
of the group of Afro-Americans would omit the historical experience of racism and 
the resistance against it which forms part of the Afro-American identity which 
should not be forgotten if we are making an effort to fully include Afro-Americans 
into the whole of society. Compare Blum (1994; 1998, p. 56).M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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tied to culturally defined groups of individuals, and the civilization in terms 
of the entire humanity is the intercultural dialogue. The significant feature 
of the intercultural dialogue is the effort to find certain a transcultural 
feature in common which might be shared by all cultures and therefore 
by the entire human civilization. The effort to agree on certain commonly 
shared fundamental norms makes human rights a significant topic 
(MARITAIn, 1949).8 In this intercultural debate, we often encounter two 
extreme positions. given that on one side stand the essentialists and on 
the other side the relativists, the discussion is analogous to the debate 
on cultures as mentioned previously.
Leaving aside the intra-cultural discussion on this topic, it is possible 
to say with respect to the intercultural dialogue that the essentialists as 
well as the relativists present some convincing arguments, though their 
fundamental views are questionable (IgnATIEFF, 2001). For essentialists, 
human rights are not a mere creation of human beings but they have 
deeper origin. According to the essentialist view, human rights are 
natural which means that they naturally belong to all human beings or 
that their origin is divine, etc. All these kinds of views, however diverse 
in their argumentation, relate to a questionable opinion which states that 
human rights have an essence which has to be discovered and spread 
across all cultures.9
The relativists justifiably point out the fact that the formulation 
and promotion of  human rights were and are given by their particular 
selection which was made by one group of individuals or another. This 
selection is usually promoted as a universal collection of rights and 
implemented against other norms which are shared by other cultures. 
The norms of the past were enforced in the similar manner in various 
colonialist expansions, for example, of which the European colonialism 
was probably the most famous for as well as its pseudo-universalism 
of human rights (WALLERSTEIn, 2006). Practices of the contemporary 
superpowers are, in this respect, followers of this legacy. Various culturally 
tinged fundamentalisms in various parts of the world are then the other 
side of the same coin. This pseudo-universalism must be rejected on the 
same basis as cultural imperialism.
8  The conferences concerning the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights took place especially within the framework of various activities of 
Un under the heading of Dignity and Justice for All of Us: <http://www.ohchr.org/
En/UDHR/Pages/60UDHRIntroduction.aspx>.
9  If this conception of human rights was intra-culturally suitable to a certain 
community in which it developed and if it was not forced by them upon other 
communities, the shortfall of such a conception would lie ‘only’ in the fact that it 
would not be a case of human rights or the rights belonging to all human beings.M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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nevertheless the objective of essentialists to achieve universal rights 
is worth following if it was not based on particularism which is not 
shared by others. In this respect, the relativists fail. It is not possible to 
deduce from the various present failures as the relativists do attempt, 
the impossibility of a consensus on universal values and therefore 
the necessity of the relativism. The possibility of a social construct of 
universally shared rights which have their bases in various cultures 
remains here, and likewise the many attempts directed towards its 
achievement through the intercultural dialogue. The pseudo-universalistic 
misuse of human rights meanwhile confirms the power of the idea of 
human rights because it is an example of the fact that various groups 
of individuals feel it useful to mask their particular interests behind the 
widely accepted view of human rights. On the other hand the positive 
contribution of relativism is its acceptance and respect of cultural 
plurality. But if we do not want to end up in the relativist indifference to 
genocides, cannibalism, torture and other brutal approaches to human 
beings, we must admit that recognition of the other persons should 
contain certain limits which should not be overstepped.
The formulation of commonly shared limits of this kind presupposes 
mutual  understanding  between  the  participants  of  the  dialogue 
(SCHMIED-KOWARzIK, 2002; HOLEnSTEIn, 1999). Every language 
or languages of individual cultures have their own specific features 
which are not shared by other cultures. This does not mean that the 
dispute is absolute and that there is no space for mutual inspiration and 
overlapping of categories which might be articulated for the purpose 
of consensus on a specific issue.10 These overlapping and universally 
shared categories may be considered as social constructs which follow 
on from similar approaches to similar problems which are encountered by 
various cultures; they could also be cultural universals (WIREDU, 1996) 
or speech universals (HOLEnSTEIn, 1998; HOLESTEIn, 1985), if we use 
the terms of Kwasi Wiredu, and Elmar Holenstein. Whatever the basis of 
this is, there are long-term circumstances for socially created universals 
on a global scale due to the fact that none of the larger cultural circles are 
isolated and they do influence each other. At least since the 15th century 
there has been a significant world expansion of the West which was in 
return influenced in an unequal relationship by cultures which the West 
encountered. The globalization trends of recent times only encouraged 
these encounters between cultures. This fact is not an evidence of a kind 
of shared unity; nevertheless, it is a testimony of at least an awareness 
of common problems which cannot be ignored. Despite the fact that the   
 
10  For the conclusions of these thoughts see Taylor (1999).M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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list of these problems is by no means identical in all cultures, there are 
certain overlaps. Although the hierarchy of these issues is not identical 
between cultures, it is the subject of the discussion itself which can lead 
to particularly fruitful results. One of these outcomes is a definite level of 
consensus in regard to designating a group of human rights.
It would be erroneousness to identify the creation of human rights 
solely within Western civilization and declare the Western authors such 
as john Locke, john Stuart Mill and others as their creators. The universal 
characteristics of human rights can be found in various cultures in which 
the requirements for action and behavior of people were being formed in 
the course of the historical development of moral, philosophical, religious 
and other systems of norms. Despite the fact that these rights were 
gradually formed in a Western context since the 16th century in connection 
with the American and the French revolutions, the development of a 
form of human rights has a significantly older tradition amongst many 
cultures.
Moreover, an important aspect of human rights is not just their 
formulation but also their active implementation in history. In view of 
this fact, it is important to realize that equivalents of particular types 
of human rights were in practice in various non-Western cultures in 
the past which were often eliminated by Western colonization. The 
interpretation of the development and implementation of human rights 
therefore require letting go of illusions about a singular civilization role 
from one of the cultural circles, namely the West. This should not mean 
a resignation from articulating human rights also from a Western point 
of view which should input into the intercultural discussion but not as 
the main contributor.
The search for some kind of implementation of human rights in the 
Western culture was often connected with references to the Westphalian 
era of national states. The national framework of Western thought was 
the solution for both dominant streams of thinking: the thinking on 
legislation for the sovereignty of people as well as the thinking on the 
rights of private individuals concerning despotic rulers and oppressive 
majorities. These thoughts sometimes turn into disagreements which 
these two interpretations interlink while connecting the public autonomy 
of state citizens with the private autonomy of individuals.
jürgen Habermas explains the relationship between both parts of 
autonomy within the context of human rights which he conceives as an 
institutionalization of ‘communication conditions’ under which we can 
form a political will (HABERMAS, 1998). The sovereignty of the people 
gives foundation to democracy and to rights which are interlinked into 
reciprocal conditioning in the form of private and state autonomies.M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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Habermas is also aware of the contentious implementation of 
worldwide democracy which is apparent from ambivalent comments 
on this topic in his various texts (HABERMAS, 1998). Multiple notions 
of democracy which cover areas from formal democracy and democratic 
populism across to democratic centralism to various versions of Islamic 
democracy as well as the resistance to forceful and frequently mere 
rhetorical implementations of democracy beyond Western borders, in the 
case of the war on Iraq, for example, lead many of its present advocates to 
cautiousness (COHEn, 2006). The emphasis on intercultural dialogue and 
tolerance of diverse regimes is presently stressed by various authors, by 
john Rawls, for example, in his conception of international rights based 
on the law of nations.
In the effort to arrive at mutual recognition and consensus within 
the framework of intercultural dialogue, it is necessary to distinguish 
between at least four types of models of arrangement which are discussed 
in the dialogue. These models contain various views on cultural, political, 
social, and economic arrangements.
Firstly, it is possible to try to achieve the least demanding model 
– modus vivendi, which will ensure a certain consensus in the current 
power structure. This model is usually part of practical-political thoughts 
and compromises. Secondly, it may be possible to try to achieve the 
intercultural model which recognizes the differences of various cultures 
while searching for the consensus on fundamental human rights as a 
boundary of acceptable tolerance. This model is more demanding than 
modus vivendi because its normative conception reaches beyond the 
current power structure of the participants in the dialogue, while it is 
less demanding than the collection of all human rights. The achievement 
of desirable consensus on a collection of all human rights will require 
overcoming the double meanings of human rights definition. Thirdly, it is 
possible to recognize other cultures with tolerance although, within the 
framework of our culture or in a narrow framework of our nation, we can 
have a more specifically defined idea of human rights which may not be 
shared by other cultures and nations. In relation to this, it may be said that 
the welfare state has been forming since the World War II as a consensus 
of social democrats and Christian democrats in the Western European 
states and its followers hope that it might be eventually accepted by 
other cultures. At the same time there are political conceptions within 
which make claims for their legitimacy. We can advocate significantly 
more demanding social/socialist and democratic arrangement structure 
than the one realized up to now in the conception of human rights 
regime in the European Union or the USA, for example. Fourthly, within 
the framework of each culture, each nation or each minority unit, there M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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are various social groups and individuals that prefer their own so-called 
comprehensive model which is based on specific philosophical, religious 
or other views.11 They do not try to force this model on other communities 
and individuals, and they are aware of the fact that it is not shared by 
all the people. They nevertheless may present this model to others and 
attempt to justify its persuasiveness. 
Therefore, if we try to reach more than the modus vivendi (the first 
model) we will approach the intercultural model (the second model). 
Regarding this model, Axel Honneth states that human rights are 
presently mostly perceived not only as the conditions for communication 
but as claims that persons recognize each other in order to arrange the 
necessary social, economic and civic conditions of their respect or dignity 
(HOnnETH, 1995). They are at the same time related to the requirements 
for the rules of a solidary community of people. The principal definition of 
these claims for all is a condition for realization of the human existence. 
People need a guarantee of at least several types of fundamental human 
rights for the realization of human existence within the framework of the 
community.
The fundamental value of community which operates on the basis of 
mutual relationships between members of the community is stressed also 
by Confucian authors from China and other countries with the Confucian 
culture, despite the fact that some questions are answered differently. 
These relationships are various forms of recognition, such as self-esteem, 
human dignity, equality, and respect for the other, as stated by C. Ihara 
(IHARA, 2004). The recognition of human dignity and equality of human 
beings here follows from membership in the community. The rituals li 
or relationships in the community serve at the same time the needs of 
an individual as a foundation of the cultivation of the self as well as the 
requirements of an arrangement of community (ROSEMOnT, 2004).
The Confucian ideal of community together with the ethical notion of 
social roles and the emphasis on harmonious relationships are principals 
which, from a Confucian perspective, could stand at the forefront of human 
rights and which could serve the promotion of humanity. According to 
D. Wong, both types of traditions: such as the law orientated ones as 
well as the community orientated ones need such a notion of community 
which would be able to offer a creative problem solving approach to the 
relationships of people while ‚not losing face‘ (WOng, 2004). The basis 
is the inter-subjective notion of the Confucian virtue of zhen. Humanity, 
which contains a pictogram of relationship of two persons, is a category   
 
11  Rawls distinguishes between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions 
which look away from comprehensive doctrines. See Rawls (1993, p. 11 nn).M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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of relatedness, of agens societas (KRAL, 2005). It may serve for resolving 
conflicts in human relationships and so prevent the contentious legal 
decision making process about correctness at court proceedings. It is 
possible to speak of community anchoring of rights in this respect.
The emphasis on the community is faced by the strong individualistic 
tendencies of some Western liberally orientated theories. The Confucians 
similarly to Western communitarians criticize excessive evaluation of 
individual rights. Henry Rosemont on the one hand mentions that if the 
most fundamental human rights are to be considered the individualistically 
conceived political rights, it would be difficult to anchor the idea of human 
rights in the Confucian tradition (ROSEMOnT, 2004). On the other hand he 
states that it is possible to incorporate human rights into the Confucian 
notion of the membership of human beings in the community.12
C. Ihara states that, from a Confucian point of view, the individuals’ 
rights are valuable especially at a time when it is necessary to use them 
in the context of the degradation of communal relationships (IHARA, 
2004). The virtues such as relationships based on recognition should play 
the primary role according to j. Chan while the legislation mechanism 
should support this role only in the case of it failing to function (CHAn, 
1999). This notion is certainly not unusual even to the socially orientated 
streams of Western theory and praxis. According to various Confucian 
authors, the main streams of Western thought and praxis may find a 
consensus with Confucianism on the subject of human rights (BARY and 
TU, 1998; AngLE, 2002).
The recognition of women’s rights including citizens and social rights, 
which are discussed more frequently in relation to the Islamic culture, 
might be promoted with a successful result too, as argued by Adbullah 
Ahmed An-na’im.13 This might be possible if cultural and religious 
communities are placed in a more advantageous position rather than 
if the search of the solution to problems operates only on an abstract 
level. norani Othman states that an experience of many active groups 
of women demonstrates that, in their everyday conflicts, a development 
was achieved by utilizing specific cultural paradigms (OTHMAn, 1999; 
An-nA‘IM, 2002; göLE, AMMAnn, 2006). This does not in the least 
mean surrendering the secular state. Common approaches shared by 
Western and non-Western women‘s movements consist of anchoring in 
the framework of current social system from which prejudices stem and   
 
12  now this is realized also by more and more Western authors within the discussion 
on intercultural dialogue. See, for example, Rawls, (1999, p. 72 nn).
13  On the interconnectedness of religious, cultural and political discussions in the 
secular state see An-na’im (2005).M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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against which the fight takes place. The optimal notion of human rights, 
which is in accordance with Islamic values, is founded in idzhtihad, the 
critical re-evaluation of Muslim canonical texts which can also include 
sharia.
The significant measure of human rights lies also in their social and 
economic dimension. Yash ghai correctly states that values and attitudes 
towards rights are primarily conditioned by material relations even despite 
the fact that there is not an identity of ideology and reality (gHAI, 1999). 
He points out the effect of globalization on the material situation of people 
in the example of Asia and in this way also highlights understanding of 
the rights and their practical implementation. Leslie Sklair analyses two 
crises in relation to globalization, on the one hand the class polarization 
and on the other ecological problems of unsustainable development 
(SKLAIR, 2008). According to Sklair, both crises are connected with the 
culture and ideology of consumerism which directs the dynamics of global 
capitalism. Against these crises, he places culture and ideology of human 
rights in which he sees a potential for the solution of these crises. Human 
rights are conceived as rights which also have a social and economic 
dimension from which democracy benefits.
A similar topic from a different perspective is formulated by jeffrey 
Flynn who also talks about the material conditions of intercultural 
dialogue. He argues that it is necessary to overcome the usual focus of 
intercultural dialogue. He concerns with the wider social and economic 
context in which intercultural dialogue takes place on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, with duties, especially with social and economic 
human rights (FLYnn, 2008). Intercultural dialogue might arise with 
more difficulties in the situation of the extreme poverty which rules 
many people especially in developing countries. Only the abolishment 
of poverty will enable legitimate formation of institutions which could 
operate in the cosmopolitan environment. This approach requires focusing 
not just on moral-legal discourse but more prominently on the ethical-
political discourse than has been the case up until now, which means a 
discourse based on a community relationships framework. This emphasis 
also means a more in depth interest in the practical implementation of 
the norms.
The responsibility for the promotion of human rights is presently carried 
by individual states that are, in the contemporary era of globalization, 
increasingly less able to guarantee the promotion and implementation 
of human rights because of a weakening influence of the states towards 
the strong global economic actors, mainly transnational corporations. 
It is therefore necessary to research and promote human rights in the 
present post-Westphalian era with the aid of intercultural dialogue at M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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a local community level across to national and international levels of 
communities and finally at a global level.
4.  Conclusion: ‘’Magna Charta’’ for the whole of humanity
The proposed view so far necessitates raising the more empirical 
question about the formation of a legal document such as the ‘Magna 
Charta for the whole of humanity’. Within the framework of current 
international law, the first one of these legal documents is the well known 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The lesson taken from the World War Two led to the creation of the Un 
and the establishment of the Un Commission for Human Rights in 1946, 
which was already from the outset concerned with a proposal for the 
universal declaration of human rights. Initially, the representatives of 18 
states participated, while a group of 8 individuals from Australia, Chile, 
China, France, Lebanon, USSR, great Britain, and USA participated on the 
formulation of the Declaration. The Secretariat of Un subsequently prepared 
the proposal on the basis of these formulations which were the foundation 
for further discussions and proposals for changes from other Member states.
The declaration was accepted in 1948 at the Un general Assembly in 
the presence of 58 Member states from many cultural circles. 48 of them 
voted for its benefit, 8 abstained, and the representatives of 2 states were 
not present at the vote.14 It is therefore possible to say that although the 
original proposal was created by the group of individuals which was not 
sufficiently representatively composed from the representatives of many 
nations and various cultures of the whole world, the following discussions 
and approval of the document were already achieved by a relatively 
comprehensive even if not exhaustive representation.
The text of the Declaration is a result of an attempt to formulate 
binding norms which could be shared across individual nations and 
cultures. Due to the fact that representatives of various cultural circles 
participated on the formulation of this Declaration with an endeavor to 
find common norms, it can be considered almost as a transcultural result 
of an intercultural dialogue. It certainly is not a perfect result which would 
fulfill all requirements placed on the intercultural representation and on 
transcultural consensus. nonetheless, it is possible to talk about one of the 
first few articulations of global standards. In the age of planetary, military 
and other types of aggressive interactions, such an intercultural vision 
for transculturally shared values is an act of considerable significance. 
Transcultural models of human rights provide a common normative   
 
14  Declaration was approved on 10th December 1948 in Palais de Chaillot in Paris. 
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foundation which should be the starting point in supporting the abolition 
of various military and other types of conflicts.
Although the Declaration is not legally binding, it became the basis 
for the creation of a number of documents which are legally binding. 
Let’s mention at least the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.15 Both Covenants were approved by many states in the Un 
general Assembly, and they were both more or less equally ratified into 
the present times by the majority of the states.16 Other legal documents 
further specify and supplement these Covenants in relation to various 
social, economic, cultural, political, citizens, environmental and other 
rights (SKLAIR, 2008).
Various rights must be sufficiently defined against each other. In 
this respect, the Un promotes three fundamental characteristics of 
human rights: universality, indivisibility, interdependence. I would 
like to stress especially the importance of the fact that the economic, 
cultural, civil, political, and social rights, if presented in alphabetical 
order, are mutually conditioned and supported. However, it does not yet 
guarantee the consensus on exactly what rights to promote and what 
kind of relationship should exist between these rights. A typical example 
is the conflict between social and political rights or the conflict between 
individual rights and the rights interconnected with living in community. 
This conflict is apparent in discussions between the north and South, 
between the West and East, or between the individual states. 
It is essential to realize that ratified human rights in international 
documents are so far a claim which has not yet quite been achieved. That 
is exactly why we talk about fundamental human rights which should 
be fulfilled and achieved first. At the same time it is necessary not to 
give up on the discussion about the more extensive collection of human 
rights which has already been defined in international documents. The 
accomplishment of human rights requires the support of a collection of 
fundamental human rights which can receive stronger support and thus   
 
15  Covenants were approved in 1966 after almost 20 years of the preparatory process 
within the framework of Un. They came into force 10 years later in 1976, after 
necessary ratification process. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966, 1976); The International Covenant on Citizen and Political 
Rights (1966, 1976).
16  The number of states that ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights was 158 by 18th April 2008, and the number of states that ratified 
the International Covenant on Citizen and Political Rights was 161. See: Ratifications 
and Reservations: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm. 
In regard of the economic, social and cultural rights see: Ratifications and 
Reservations: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm.M. Hrubec – Preconditions of an intercultural dialogue ...
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wider implementation. It will be easier to move from the fundamental 
human rights to the wider collection of human rights and possibly to their 
redefined and gradually specified form. This is nonetheless a complex 
matter and challenging topic for the intercultural discussion.
In the end of this article, I would like to stress the requirement that 
each side of the dialogue should be recognized by getting social and other 
conditions for offering their own proposal in the process of intercultural 
forming of transcultural norms. The proposals should then be discussed 
with the aim to approve a common proposal. It would not be acceptable 
to create quasi-transcultural human rights as an offshoot of Western 
national rights. Thus, it is important that we are not only open to the 
global redefinition of our viewpoints and to proposals of other cultures 
but also that we get involved in the argumentation on various levels with 
the appropriate models of arrangement and from various perspectives of 
the dialogue, as I discussed in this article.
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